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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AwAY FRom Ti m CoumRS. By Mark
Tushnet.t Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. 254.
$29.95.
James E. Temingt-
In recent years, many scholars have called for taking the Constitution
seriously outside the courts, and thus looking to legislatures, executives, and
citizens generally for fuller protection of constitutional norms. In his book,
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet sup-
ports this view and travels "beyond judicial minimalism" in order to argue
that constitutional interpretation belongs outside the courts and directly in
the hands of the people.
In this Book Review, Professor Reming examines Professor Tushnet's
arguments against judicial supremacy and in support of making constitu-
tional interpretation less court-centered to pursue a populist constitutional
law. The review concedes that Professor Tushnet's arguments that the "thick
Constitution"-in particular, its commitments to federalism, states' rights,
and separation ofpowers-is self-enforcing through the political processes are
compelling. But it contends that he fails to make the case that the "thin
Constitution"--for example, its fundamental guarantees of equality, frer-
doam of expression, and liberty-should be treated as similarly self-enforcing.
Furthermore, Professor Reming charges that Professor Tushnet does not ade-
quately elaborate how legislatures, executives, and ctizens should conscien-
tiously interpret the Constitution, or sufficiently consider how to revise our
current practice to make it more likely that these bodies will fulfill their obliga-
tions to do so. Finally, he argues that Tushnet's notion of the thin Constitu-
tion is too thin to constitute us as a people. Nonetheless, the review concludes
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that Professor Tushnet has helped lay the groundwork for taking the Consti-
tution seriously outside the courts, not by taking it away from courts, but
instead by taking it to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. Moreo-
ver, Professor Fleming concludes that Professor Tushnet's book is the most
provocative and signficant contribution to this project to date.
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Warren Court, constitutional law scholars with
misgivings about judicial interpretation and enforcement of the Con-
stitution by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have repeatedly called
for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts, and thus look-
ing to legislatures and executives for fuller protection of constitu-
tional norms.' Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts2 is the most comprehensive, thoughtful, and provocative answer
to those calls to date. For that reason, it warrants careful attention
and serious criticism.
Tushnet offers powerful arguments against judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation and provides an assessment ofjudicial re-
view that should sober even the most committed, court-loving consti-
tutionalists. In addition, he advances the best arguments I have
encountered for the proposition that the Constitution is self-enforc-
ing through the political processes rather than through judicial re-
view. Finally, he sketches an attractive vision of populist constitutional
law outside the courts. On this vision, the "thin Constitution"-the
principles, aspirations, and ends proclaimed in the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Preamble to the Constitution-constitutes us as
a people. And we the people, who are engaged in a project of self-
government in pursuit of those principles, aspirations, and ends, are
charged with, and are worthy of, the responsibility of interpreting the
Constitution ourselves as well as through our legislatures and
executives.
I See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 9-10 (1993); ROBIN WEST,
PROGRESSIvE CONSTrTUTIONALISM 190-210 (1994); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. Rzv. 1212 (1978) [hereinafter
Sager, Fair Measure); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Thinness]. A notable
earlier book challenged the view that the Constitution is solely what the courts say it is and
analyzed the responsibility of members of Congress to deliberate on constitutional issues.
See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUmo: A STUDY OF REsPONSIBt1L'
(1966). Notable recent works that take the Constitution seriously outside the courts In-
clude PAUL BREST Er AL., PROCESSES OF CONsTrruTIoNAL DECISIONMAKING (4th ed. 2000);
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONsTUTIONALiSM: FROM THEORY TO PoLTms (1996); SA.N
FORD LEVINSON, CONSTITrrIONAL FAITH (1988); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND PowERs OF THE PEOPLE (1996); KErrm E. WHrrINOTON, CONSTrruTIONAL CONSTRUC-
TION: DIVIDED PowERs AND CONSTTUTONAL MEANING (1999).
2 MARK TUSHNET, TAXING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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But Tushnet fails adequately to elaborate how legislatures, execu-
tives, and citizens should conscientiously interpret the Constitution.
Furthermore, he fails sufficiently to consider how to revise our current
practice to make it more likely that these bodies will fulfill their obli-
gations to do so. My general criticism is that Tushnet does not estab-
lish that taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts requires,
in his terms, "taking the Constitution away from the courts." Rather, I
contend, it requires taking the Constitution to legislatures, executives,
and citizens in order that these bodies might better frame and guide
their reflections, deliberations, and decisions by constitutional princi-
ples, aspirations, and ends.
Furthermore, instead of eliminating judicial review, we should re-
strict it to provisions and commitments of the Constitution that are
properly judicially enforceable, and leave the enforcement of other
provisions and commitments to legislatures, executives, and citizens.
This approach entails judicially enforcing constitutional norms in situ-
ations where the political processes are systematically untrustworthy,
but judicially "underenforcing" constitutional norms (to use Law-
rence Sager's term)3 in situations in which the political processes are
systematically trustworthy. In the latter situations, where we can trust
legislatures and executives to enforce constitutional norms, we should
indeed take the Constitution away from the courts.4
In criticizing Tushnet's book, I focus on three main points. In
Part I of this Review, I assess Tushnet's arguments against judicial
supremacy. Although his arguments are powerful and persuasive, I
maintain that they work better as a conscientious legislator's, execu-
tive's, and citizen's guide to constitutional interpretation, within a sys-
tem otherwise characterized by judicial supremacy, than as a
refutation ofjudicial supremacy itself. In Part II, I consider his argu-
ments againstjudicial review and for the self-enforcing Constitution. I
concede that his arguments that the "thick Constitution"r-in particu-
lar, commitments to federalism, states' rights, and separation of pow-
3 Sager, Fair Measure supra note 1, at 1213; Sager, Thinness, supra note 1, at 419.
4 SeeJames E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L Rzv. 211,
291-92, 296-97 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Construcing];James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic
Liberties, and the Specter ofLochner, 41 WM. & MARYL. Rav. 147,147, 165-72 (1999) [herein-
after Fleming, FRdelityl; James E. Fleming, SecuringDdiberat ive Autonorno 48 SA.-. L Ray. 1,
22-23 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing]. My approach has important affinities uith
John Hart Ely's famous theory of "democracy and distrust," which suggests thatjudicial
review is justified in situations in which the political processes are systematically untrust-
worthy. JomN HRT ELY, DtocRacy AN Dtsmusn A THaomv OFJuIctAL REvNiM 101-04
(1980). My approach differs in at least two significant respects: it identifies the situations
of distrust differently (largely because it is grounded in a different conception of democ-
racy), and it develops the idea of judicial underenforcement of norms in situations in
which the political processes are s)stematically trustworthy (an idea that is at best implicit
in Ely's analysis).
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ers-is self-enforcing through the political processes are compelling.
However, I contend that his arguments that the "thin Constitution"
should be treated as self-enforcing are unpersuasive. In Part III, I take
up Tushnet's arguments for a populist constitutional law. I argue that
his notion of the "thin Constitution" is too thin to constitute us as a
people, and I suggest that there are better ways of thinking about the
thinness or thickness of constitutional law.
Finally, in Part IV, I develop the implications of my prior work for
the project of taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts-
not by taking it away from courts, but by taking it to legislatures, execu-
tives, and citizens generally. Despite my criticisms, Tushnet's book is
provocative and radical in a good sense: It goes to the root of the
matter, addressing the fundamental question in constitutional theory
of who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution. Perhaps one
measure of the success of Tushnet's book is that I-an unabashed
Dworkinian and a propounder of what might appear to be one of the
grandest court-centered constitutional theories of them allr-am per-
suaded by his arguments againstjudicial review and for the self-enforc-
ing Constitution to the extent that I am. It bears noting that many
progressives like Tushnet have been dubious aboutjudicial review and
skeptical about the Constitution in light of their progressive and egali-
tarian political and moral commitments.6 To the extent that
Tushnet's book proves successful, it may mark a point in history at
which progressives learn to hate judicial review but to love the Consti-
tution, or at least to affirm their faith in the Constitution without plac-
ing any hope in courts for the realization of its core commitments.
I
TuSHNET's ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUDICI&L SvPRENLAcY
A. Who May Authoritatively Interpret the Constitution?
In developing his argument against judicial supremacy and for a
populist constitutional law, Tushnet advances a distinction between
the thick and the thin Constitution. The thick Constitution, accord-
5 See Fleming, Constructing supra note 4, at 226,282;James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1335, 1338-39 (1997); Fleming, Securing, supra
note 4, at 9. In all of these pieces, I draw upon Dworkin's work, both for its conception of
the character of constitutional interpretation and for its conception of the substance of
our constitutional commitments. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRmIN, F E.Dosi's LAW: THE MoAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSIITUTION (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, MORAL READING];
RONALD DwoumiN, LIFE's DomNION (1993).
6 See, e.g., Wrzr, supra note 1, at 160-61 (mentioning Tushnet, among others, as such
a progressive constitutional skeptic); Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy
Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1993); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of
Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Cni. L. REV. 453
(1992).
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ing to Tushnet, "contains a lot of detailed provisions describing how
the government is to be organized."7 These provisions include evi-
dently minor provisions, such as the "opinions in writing" clause and
many administrative provisions. They also include "detailed arrange-
ments regarding federalism, states' rights, and the separation of pow-
ers."s Tushnet suggests that the thick Constitution's provisions meet
with "public indifference," for they "do not thrill the heart" or "gener-
ate impassioned declarations."9
The thin Constitution consists of "its fundamental guarantees of
equality, freedom of expression, and liberty."' 0 Tushnet drais upon
the work of Gary Jacobsohn, who, quoting Abraham Lincoln, de-
scribes "'[t]he Union and the Constitution' as 'the picture of silver,'
the 'frame[ ],' around the 'apple of gold,' the principles of the Decla-
ration of Independence."" Tushnet adds, quoting Lincoln: "'The
picture was made for the apple-not the apple for the picture.'"12
That is, "the frame of silver... was made for the apple of gold."13 He
contends, and interprets Lincoln as believing, that "[tihe project the
Constitution established for the people of the United States... was
the vindication of the Declaration's principles: the principle that all
people were created equal, the principle that all had inalienable
rights."14
Furthermore, Tushnet asserts that "the national project includes
vindicating the parts of the Constitution's Preamble that resonate with
the Declaration: the nation's commitment to 'establishJustice, ensure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to . . . our
[P]osterity.'""5 Notably, Tushnet omits from this quotation the first
purpose or aspiration stated in the Preamble: "to form a more perfect
Union."16 He believes that this end "does not resonate with the Decla-
ration's principles as the other purposes recited in the Preamble
do."17 Evidently he believes that it does not partly constitute us as a
people.
7 Tusm,-=, supra note 2, at 9.
8 Id. at 14.
9 d. at 10.
10 Id. at 11.
11 Id. (quoting GARYJAcoBSOHN. APPLE OF GOLD: Cos-tmno-zusLis. l% IsRE. A,,D
THE U-rrED STATES 3 (1993) (alteration in original)).
12 Id. (quotingJAcosoHN, supra note 11, at 3).
1 Id. at 14.
14 Id. at 11.
15 Id. at 12 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
16 U.S. CoNsr. pmbl.
17 TusHNm¢, supra note 2, at 14.
20001 219
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Tushnet states that "[p]opulist constitutional law vindicates the
thin Constitution."'8 Most importantly, he contends, "the nation's
commitment to the thin Constitution constitutes us as the people of
the United States."19 He adds: "constituting a people is a morally wor-
thy project," and "the thin Constitution... is an element in a good
society."20 Together, Tushnet maintains, "[t]he Declaration and the
Preamble provide the substantive criteria for identifying the people's
vital interests."21 Finally, he submits that "the thinness of the populist
Constitution is essential if the position I am developing is to be at all
defensible."22 This submission, however, may undermine the entire
enterprise, as we shall see.
Two observations are in order here. First, there is nothing inher-
ently populist about the idea that the project that the Constitution
establishes for the people of the United States is the vindication of the
Declaration's principles and the Preamble's aspirations. Second,
there is nothing about this idea that is necessarily against judicial
supremacy. For one can certainly believe that a constitutional theorist
could embrace this vision of the project, yet be altogether antipopulist
and projudicial supremacy. For example, Sotirios Barber embraces
this view in On What the Constitution Means2 3 and The Constitution of
Judicial Power.24 Additionally, one could characterize Dworkin's con-
stitutional theory along similar lines.25 On Barber's view, the Declara-
tion and the Preamble express our noblest commitments and our
highest aspirations, which courts as the forum of principle are obli-
gated to vindicate against popular encroachment or neglect.26 Of
course, Tushnet might well retort to Barber, "the constitution ofjudi-
cial power indeed!"
Readers familiar with Tushnet's prior work (which is among the
best work to grow out of the Critical Legal Studies movement) 2 7 may
be surprised with his argument that the thin Constitution-which
commits us to the project of vindicating the "inalienable rights," "uni-
18 Id. at 12.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 13.
22 Id.
23 Soruos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSITLION MEANs 11-12 (1984).
24 Somuos A. BARBER, THE CONSTIrTION OFJUDICIAL POWER 42-43 (1993).
25 See, e.g., RONALD DwoRaN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33-71 (1985) (arguing in a chap-
ter entitled "The Forum of Principle" that the Constitution incorporates substantive princi-
ples of political morality and that courts should be a forum for protecting those
principles); DWORKIN, MORAL READING, supra note 5, at 32 (arguing for a "moral reading"
of the Constitution, which conceives it as embodying abstract moral principles, and de-
fending judicial vindication of such principles).
26 See BARBER, supra note 23, at 9.
27 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHIrE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw (1988).
220 [Vol. 86:215
THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE TE COURTS
versal human rights," and "unassailable moral truths" proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence-constitutes us as a people.2- For
he has been quite skeptical about rights,- 9 and indeed remains so,
with certain qualifications, in this book.30 In addition, he is famous
for making statements like "[c]ritique is all there is,"a which appear
to be in tension with such an evidently constructive and morally ambi-
tious project. As a liberal who "takes rights seriously,"3 2 I am pleased
to see a crit like Tushnet come out so unapologetically in support of
inalienable rights, universal human rights, and unassailable moral
truths.
Before assessing Tushnet's arguments againstjudicial supremacy,
we need to draw two further distinctions. We should distinguish two
common conceptions of judicial supremacy, which I shall frame in
terms of paraphrases of Chief Justice Marshall's famous utterance in
Marbuy v. Madisomn "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."a3 One is that the Supreme
Court is the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution. Or, to para-
phrase Marshall in Marbuy, "It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department-and no one else-to say what the law is."34
On this view, questions about what the Constitution means are noth-
ing but questions about what the courts have said, or are likely to say,
about what the Constitution means. It is not required, and indeed not
appropriate, for legislatures, executives, and citizens to engage in in-
dependent constitutional interpretation.
The other conception ofjudicial supremacy is that the Supreme
Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Or, again to para-
phrase Marbuy, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department-ultimately, after the other branches of government
have conscientiously considered what the Constitution requires of
them-to say what the law is." On this view, legislatures, executives,
and citizens generally have the obligation in the first instance to con-
sider conscientiously what the Constitution requires of them before
taking contemplated actions. However, in the final analysis, the
courts must authoritatively interpret the Constitution and decide
whether those actions comport with the Constitution. Constitutional
theorists like Barber or Dworkin can embrace this position, yet also
argue ultimately for aggressive judicial review. To generalize, we
28 TusHNr, supra note 2, at 11, 31, 181.
29 See, eg., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L REv. 1363 (1984).
30 See, e.g., TusmaT, supra note 2, at 137-43.
31 TusH-r, supra note 27, at 318.
32 I allude, of course, to RoNWm DWoPMN, TAMuG RIGHTs SEmousLy (1977).
-3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
34 Tushnet offers this very paraphrase as a formulation of a conception of judidal
supremacy. See TusHN-r, supra note 2, at 7.
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should distinguish answers to the question who may authoritatively in-
terpret the Constitution from conceptions of the proper scope ofjudi-
cial review.
It is also important to distinguish two common readings of Mar-
bury.35 One is the broad view that it is the special province of the
courts to guard the Constitution against legislative and executive en-
croachment. The other is the narrow view that it is only incidentally
the province of the courts, when they otherwise must interpret the
Constitution, to enforce it against legislative or executive encroach-
ment. The former reading leads to a dim view of the idea of the Con-
stitution outside the courts. But the latter reading is not necessarily
incompatible with a view that we should take seriously the idea of the
Constitution outside the courts.
It is striking and problematic that Tushnet alludes to each of
these distinctions,36 but then elides each of them-and in turn elides
each into the other-and simply criticizes "a general theory ofjudicial
supremacy."37 He may believe that these distinctions are distinctions
without a difference from the standpoint of his larger project of tak-
ing the Constitution away from the courts. However, maintaining
these distinctions will enable us to see that although he fails to make
the case for taking the Constitution away from the courts altogether,
he succeeds marvelously in showing certain ways in which our current
practice, rightly understood, already contemplates that legislatures,
executives, and citizens generally may engage in independent consti-
tutional interpretation.
Tushnet challenges the general theory of judicial supremacy in
several ways. First, he mentions the political question doctrine, which
"leaves some constitutional decisions to Congress and the president
with no possibility ofjudicial review."38 Second, he notes other "situa-
tions in which it might seem that an official could reject the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretations without running the risk of be-
coming the defendant in a lawsuit," and thus giving the Court an op-
portunity ultimately to reaffirm its interpretations.39 Here he refers to
certain famous instances in which courts upheld the constitutionality
of legislation, but then executives concluded instead that the legisla-
tion was unconstitutional. For example, PresidentJefferson pardoned
political allies convicted under the antisedition statute on the ground
that it violated the First Amendment's protection of freedom of
35 For a distinction along these lines between two readings of Marbuly, see, for exam-
ple, GERALD GuNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTrrUTIONAL LA4W 2-3 (13th ed. 1997).
36 See TusHNET, supra note 2, at 6-7.
37 Id. at 17, 22, 32.
38 Id. at 16.
39 Id. at 15.
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speech, notwithstanding the judicial determinations that the statute
was constitutional. 40 And PresidentJackson vetoed the national bank
bill on the ground that it was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's holding in McCulloch v. AMarland that it was
constitutional.4 1
Tushnet rightly concludes, however, that "the fact that our consti-
tutional system does not have a way to get the courts to review some
official decisions that conflict with the courts' constitutional interpre-
tations does not really counter the theory of judicial supremacy."42
He then asks, "When may a legislator disregard the courts' constitu-
tional interpretations?" 43 Drawing upon President Abraham Lincoln's
analysis, he suggests that "sometimes legislative action apparently in-
consistent with a prior judicial constitutional interpretation is not in-
consistent with a general theory of judicial supremacy."44 He states,
however, that "sometimes it is."45 Tushnet continues: "But in those sit-
uations the case for judicial supremacy is weak and the case for a pop-
ulist constitutional law implementing the thin Constitution is
strong."46
Let us begin with the first scenario. For example, proposed legis-
lation may be distinguishable from legislation that the courts have
held unconstitutional. 47 Or, prior legislative action-or inaction-
may be relevant to the courts' constitutional decisions.48 Additionally,
"[a] legislator might disregard an apparently controlling precedent,
Lincoln suggested, when it was reached in 'ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions.' 49 Or, again according to Lincoln, "a leg-
islator may support a law indistinguishable from one held unconstitu-
tional when there is a 'chance that [the earlier decision] might be
overruled.'" 50 Constitutional scholars celebrating or assumingjudicial
supremacy commonly fail to acknowledge these situations as part of
our practice. Yet they are, by Tushnet's own analysis, "fully compati-
ble with a general theory of judicial supremacy."-I
Next, let us address the second scenario. This includes situations
in which public officials' disregard of dearly controlling Supreme
Court precedents may provoke a constitutional crisis. Tushnet con-
40 Seei&L
41 See i&. (alluding to McCuloch v. Marfland, 17 U.S. (4 WAheat.) 316 (1819)).
42 Id- at 16-17.
43 Id at 17.
44 Id-
45 Id-
46 Id-
47 Seeit at 17-18.
48 See id. at 18-19.
49 Id. at 19.
50 Id. at 19-20.
51 I. at 22.
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tends that "[t]here is nothing wrong in principle with constitutional
disagreements, or even with constitutional crises as such."5 2 Or,
adapting one of Lincoln's phrases, Tushnet suggests that "a constitu-
tional crisis may be a good thing when 'vital questions affecting the
whole people' are involved."53 He states that the criteria for identify-
ing when a constitutional crisis is a good thing-when the vital inter-
ests of the whole people are at stake-are provided by the thin
Constitution.54 He contends that only a political leader who speaks
"for 'the people as a whole' can fairly identify their vital interests. " '
He also claims that such a leader is justified in ignoring Supreme
Court precedents, and thus risking a constitutional crisis, in order to
further the vital interests of the whole people at stake on his or her
reasonable interpretation of the thin Constitution. 56
Finally, he asks when ordinary citizens may disregard controlling
Supreme Court opinions. 57 The ansver, again, is that "people acting
outside the courts can ignore what the courts say about the Constitu-
tion, as long as they are pursuing reasonable interpretations of the
thin Constitution."58 In doing so, Tushnet submits, ordinary citizens
are continuing the Declaration's project.
Tushnet's chapter title, "AgainstJudicial Supremacy,"59 is an over-
statement, or a misnomer. For his argument in the chapter does not
succeed as an argument against judicial supremacy altogether. It is
more successful as an account of what nonjudicial actors legitimately
may do in acting upon conscientious interpretations of the Constitu-
tion in the face of contrary judicial interpretations, even within a gen-
eral theory of judicial supremacy (as ultimacy). A better title for the
chapter-to paraphrase the tifle of Paul Brest's famous article 6 -
would be "A Conscientious Legislator's, Executive's, and Citizen's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation in the Face of Erroneous Judi-
cial Interpretations." 61
Tushnet overstates his arguments, in part because he fails to
maintain the distinctions between ultimate and exclusive interpreter
52 Id.
53 Id. at 23.
54 See id. at 24.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 22-26.
57 See id. at 30-31.
58 Id. at 33.
59 Id. at 6.
60 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
61 My claim applies more obviously to the first situations mentioned above, but it also
applies to the second. A theory of constitutional crisis or constitutional revolution oper-
ates outside the circumstances of judicial supremacy. Thus, acknowledging the second
situation-and that a constitutional crisis or revolution might be a good thing-does not
preclude one from subscribing to a general theory ofjudicial supremacy.
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and between the narrow and broad readings of Mfarbuiy. Tushnet's
arguments are dispositive against the conception of judicial
supremacy that views the Supreme Court as the exclusive interpreter
and against the broad reading of Marbuy. The practices that he de-
scribes involve legislators, executives, and citizens taking the Constitu-
tion seriously outside the courts in ways not contemplated or
permitted by such views. But they are not dispositive with respect to
the conception of judicial supremacy that views the Supreme Court
generally as the ultimate interpreter and with respect to the narrow
reading of Marbury. Those practices are entirely compatible with such
views.
Therefore, Tushnet has not accomplished the central aim of his
own project: that of making arguments againstjudicial supremacy that
are sufficient to underwrite the project of taking the Constitution seri-
ously outside the courts by taking it away from the courts. Nonetheless,
he leaves standing the possibility that one could incorporate his analy-
sis into the project of taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts by instead taking the Constitution to legislatures, executives,
and citizens generally. Tushnet has cleared the ground for the latter
project, to which I wish to contribute by drawing upon his analysis.
B. Why Has Constitutional Theory Remained So Court-
Centered?
At the beginning of this Review, I noted that there have been
repeated calls to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts.
Despite these repeated calls, why has constitutional theory remained
so court-centered? And how might constitutional theorists break the
stranglehold of this court-centeredness?62- I shall mention six reasons
why constitutional theory has remained so court-centered, or six fac-
tors with which any constitutional theorist who seeks to break that
stranglehold, such as Tushnet, must reckon.
The first reason commonly offered is that liberals and progres-
sives who idealize the Warren Court still may believe, despite contrary
developments in the last thirty years, "that the Supreme Court under
Earl Warren-who left the Court in 1969-is the Supreme Court to-
day."63 This hypothesis is good for a laugh; no one enjoys takingjabs
at law professors more than other law professors. It reflects the ten-
dency of law professors (and Tushnet more than most) to reduce eve-
rything to political terms. But we must ponder the question more
deeply.
62 Of course, from the standpoint of a court-ccntered iew of constitutional law, we
might also ask the opposite and prior question, why have there been repeated calls to take
the Constitution seriously outside the courts?
63 Tus'rr, supra note 2, at 129.
22520001
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
The second reason is a more modest, and more plausible, version
of the first. Liberals and progressives realize that, although the War-
ren Court is long gone, the Burger Court proved to be the conserva-
tive "counter-revolution that wasn't."64 They also sigh with relief that,
although the Rehnquist Court repeatedly gives indications that the
conservative counterrevolution finally is in full swing, it typically does
so in 5-4 decisions. They comfort themselves with the thought that
the election of President Clinton and his appointments of Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer have moderated the Rehnquist Court somewhat.
And so, they hope, "if only Clinton could get a couple more appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court." And, "if only Vice-President Gore
could get elected and get a couple more appointments." Then, "if
only," and so on.
Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court-notwithstanding the strenu-
ous efforts of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas-has thrown enough crumbs from the table to liberals and
progressives to keep their hope in the courts alive.6 5 Some scholars
have disparaged, as a "hollow hope," the idea that courts can bring
about social change.66 Any hope for liberal and progressive goals
growing out of occasional victories in the Rehnquist Court is surely a
foolish hope. We should look beyond these two political reasons for
the persistence of court-centeredness in constitutional theory and
take up law professors' assumptions about the differences between
courts and legislatures, which will suggest four institutional reasons
for it.
The third reason is rooted in constitutional theorists' yearnings
for coherence, or for a coherent body of constitutional law. Based on
assumptions about the differences between courts and legislatures,
they believe that under a regime of judicial review-indeed judicial
supremacy-we will get a more coherent body of constitutional law
than we would get in a regime that left most or all constitutional ques-
tions ultimately or exclusively to legislatures, executives, and citizens.
64 I refer to the title of a well-known book. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent A. Blasi ed., 1983).
65 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (upholding, over
First Amendment challenges, a Missouri statute limiting campaign contributions); Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking down, as violative of the right to travel secured by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, California's durational
residency requirement imposed on recipients of welfare); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (finding that Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (striking down, on equal protection grounds, Colorado's constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
homosexuals).
66 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABotrr SociAL
CHANGE? (1991).
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Even if Tushnet were able to persuade such law professors that legisla-
tures and executives historically have proven to be more coherent
over time-and courts less coherent over time-than they assume,
they still would maintain that courts enjoy comparative institutional
advantages over those branches in this regard.
The fourth derives from law professors' desire for uniformity, or
for a uniform body of constitutional law (which is not the same thing
as a coherent body of constitutional law). The points just made about
coherence hold with respect to uniformity as well. This yearning has
particular force in our federal system, with a national government and
fifty state governments, not to mention countless local governments.
The fifth reason stems from constitutional theorists' yearnings for
texts that express our national commitments, ideals, and aspirations.
They yearn for sources that express commitments worthy of our aspi-
rations and that exhort us to honor those commitments. Whatever
the shortcomings of Supreme Court opinions as articulations of prin-
ciples, ideals, and aspirations (as distinguished from exercises in com-
promise, accommodation, and coalition-building), such opinions
dearly enjoy advantages in this regard over statutes, administrative
regulations, and executive orders (which typically at best implement,
rather than articulate, such commitments). Besides, law professors
love discussing the educative, expressive, and hortatory functions of
Supreme Court opinions.67 Although presidents can, and do, deliver
inspiring addresses, members of Congress are more limited in this re-
spect; even if they make eloquent speeches, or insert eloquent papers
into the Congressional Record, they typically speak only for themselves.
One can imagine Congress revising its practices to provide opportuni-
ties for fuller and richer institutional expression of commitments, ide-
als, and aspirations, for example, in committee reports on bills. But it
is hard to imagine that such reports or other institutional expressions
could satisfy the yearning under consideration better than a good
court opinion or body of opinions. Thus, even if law professors exag-
gerate the educative, expressive, and hortatory functions of Supreme
Court opinions, they are not unreasonable in thinking that courts en-
joy comparative institutional advantages over legislatures and execu-
tives in this respect.
A final, related reason stems from constitutional theorists' yearn-
ings for an institution that might be, or might aspire to be, a "forum
of principle."63 Many are in the grips of a reductive, overdrawn con-
trast between courts and legislatures that leads them to glorify courts
67 See, eg., Christopher L Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L REv. 961 (1992); Eugene V. Rostow, Te Denocratic CGarater offudidal Re,'iew, 66
HAv. L REv. 193, 208 (1952).
68 Dwo, N, A MATrER OF PmiucinLE, supra note 25, at 33.
20001
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and to disparage legislatures. They no doubt hold too exalted a view
of courts and too dismal a view of legislatures. Yet whatever the short-
comings of courts, constitutional theorists are likely to believe that
courts offer greater promise than legislatures and executives in this
regard. However, some theorists, like Sunstein, have partially flipped
this contrast and argued that legislatures and executives, not courts,
are the true fora of principle. 69
For a scholar who believes in taking the Constitution away from
courts, Tushnet does not adequately address these yearnings or rea-
sons for resistance. He does address arguments forjudicial supremacy
grounded in the view that it provides greater stability, refuting claims
or assumptions that constitutional law inside the courts is more stable
than constitutional law outside the courts would be.70 Tushnet might
think that the desire for stability subsumes the other concerns articu-
lated above. But it does not. Even if it did, a more fine-grained analy-
sis would be needed.
Tushnet might claim that he has addressed the yearning for texts
expressing national commitments, ideals, and aspirations and the
yearning for a forum of principle. In arguing against judicial review,
he effectively debunks the idea that the Supreme Court is an educa-
tional institution or a "teacher" in a "vital national seminar."'71 But
this is not sufficient. Even if this idea is overblown and in need of
being deflated, courts may enjoy relative institutional advantages over
legislatures and executives in this regard.
II
TusHNET'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE SELF-ENFORCING CONSTITUTION
Tushnet argues that the entire Constitution is self-enforcing
through the political processes. 72 He analyzes the capacities and in-
centives of legislators and executives to engage in responsible consti-
tutional interpretation outside the courts.73 Tushnet also ingeniously
develops the idea of an "incentive-compatible" or self-enforcing Con-
stitution.74 This idea suggests that the incentives of legislatures and
executives within the political processes make it likely that they will
enforce the Constitution, or at any rate do a better job of enforcing it
than courts acting outside the political processes. 75 In doing so, he
reworks James Madison's classic arguments in The Federalist 10 and 51
69 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLnCAL CONnaCT 59-60 (1996).
70 See TusN, rEr, supra note 2, at 26-30.
71 See id. at 129-53, 154-76. The quotation in the text is from Rostow, supra note 67, at
208.
72 See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 14.
73 See id. at 54-71, 95-128.
74 Id. at 95.
75 See id. at 95-128.
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about the extended republic and about how "'[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be con-
nected with the constitutional rights of the place.' " 76 Tushnet argues
that "judicial overhang"-the distorted way in which legislatures and
executives view the Constitution in the courts' shadow-has stunted
the capacities of legislators and executives (and our views of their ca-
pacities)7 7 He argues that legislatures and executives might do a bet-
terjob of fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities to interpret the
Constitution if we eliminated this judicial overhang by taking the Con-
stitution away from the courts.
First, he argues that the "thick Constitution" is self-enforcing.78
Second, he suggests that the "thin Constitution" should also be
treated as self-enforcing.79 Tushnet makes a powerful and persuasive
argument that the thick Constitution is self-enforcing through the po-
litical processes. In particular, he argues that it is self-enforcing with
respect to federalism and separation of powers. There are familiar
versions of this argument: Herbert Wechsler's famous argument about
the political safeguards of federalism, 0 itself based on Madison's class-
ical arguments in The Federalist 45 and 46,81 and a version of which the
Supreme Court, per Justice Blackmun, adopted in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.82 Justice White's argument
about judicial deference with respect to separation of powers issues03
can be understood, or reconstructed, as an argument about self-en-
forcement.84 In addition,Jesse Choper wove together such arguments
about federalism and separation of powers, although to some extent
his argument was not just about self-enforcement, but also about the
need for the Supreme Court to preserve its limited institutional capi-
76 I& at 98 (quoting THE FErmtausr No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961)).
77 Id. at 57-65.
78 See id. at 95-123.
79 See id. at 123-28.
80 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L RF. 543 (1954). For a
sophisticated and powerful reworking of Wechsler's basic idea, see Larry D. Kramer, Put-
ting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUL. L REV. 215 (2000).
81 THE FEDERAUST Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison).
82 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) (arguing that the political process inherent in American
federalism, as characterized by Madison and Wechsler, adequately safeguarded the Metro-
politan Transit Authority from congressional abuse of its power to regulate interstate
commerce).
83 See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,759-76 (1986) mWhiteJ., dissenting) (argu-
ing that congressional delegation of power to the Comptroller General to implement the
budget reduction provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act does not violate the prin-
ciple of separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (WhiteJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that the legislative veto does not violate the principle of separation of
powers).
84 See TusHNEr, supra note 2, at 98-99.
20001
CORNELL LAW REV[EW
tal in order to enable it to vindicate individual rights.85 But Tushnet
formulates this argument in an especially sophisticated and compel-
ling manner. He satisfies the yearning of constitutional designers for
"a machine that would go of itself."8 6 In sum, he argues that we can
trust the outcomes of the national political processes with regard to
protection of constitutional commitments to federalism and separa-
tion of powers.
Constitutional scholars commonly argue that the Constitution is
self-enforcing with respect to separation of powers and federalism, but
that it is not self-enforcing with respect to other provisions and com-
mitments.8 7 We could generalize the idea of self-enforcement and in-
clude Ely's well-known argument for judicial review to reinforce the
political processes in situations of distrust. According to Ely, we can
trust the national political processes to enforce the Constitution prop-
erly when separation of powers and federalism are concerned, but we
cannot trust those processes to do so when there are restrictions upon
the political processes or prejudice against discrete and insular minor-
ities. Thus, according to Ely, we need judicial reinforcement of the
preconditions for democracy in those situations.88
Tushnet, however, presents a different argument. He argues
that not only the thick Constitution-including separation of powers
and federalism-but also the thin Constitution-including individual
rights and the preconditions for democracy-is self-enforcing
through the political processes. Tushnet grants that it might be at-
tractive to develop a constitutional theory that views the thick Consti-
tution as self-enforcing, yet views judicial review as necessary to
reinforce or secure the thin Constitution (in particular, the precondi-
tions for democracy or for populist constitutional law).89 Although he
does not spell out this possibility, given his invocation of Ely's theory,
it is clear how the argument would go. The idea would be that we
cannot trust the political processes with respect to the basic liberties
that are preconditions for democracy (as understood within his con-
ception of populist constitutional law), and therefore we need judicial
review to reinforce or secure those preconditions. Given the structure
85 SeeJESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POUTICAL PROCESS 129-70
(1980).
86 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MAcHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF: THE CoNsTITUTIoN IN
AMxmcAN CULTURE (1986).
87 See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 85 (arguing forjudicial deference with respect to sepa-
ration of powers and federalism but for judicial protection of individual rights); James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L, REv.
129, 154-55 (1893) (arguing forjudicial deference with respect to the national representa-
tive processes and institutions, but suggesting that, because state governments are not coor-
dinate, those arguments for judicial deference do not apply).
88 See ELY, supra note 4, at 101-04.
89 See TusHr, supra note 2, at 125-26, 157-63.
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of my own theory, as a Constitution-perfecting theory that is analo-
gous to Ely's process-perfecting theory, I take particular interest in this
possibility.90 Tushnet mentions voting, free expression, and privacy
among such preconditions. 91 But then he makes, and too readily ac-
cepts, skeptical objections to this approach.92 Furthermore, Tushnet
fails to consider the possibility that even if the Constitution, thick and
thin, is self-enforcing through the national political processes, it is not
self-enforcing through the state political processes.
mI
REFLECONS ON THE TmINNESS OF TusHNcEr's PopuLisT
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw
Next, I take up Tushnet's arguments for a populist constitutional
law. His notion of the "thin Constitution" is too thin to do the work of
constituting us as a people. And there are better ways of thinking
about the thinness or thickness of constitutional law.93
A. The Constitution Through Thick and Thin
First, let us analyze Tushnet's distinction between the thick and
the thin Constitution. Although one might draw a useful distinction
between the thick and the thin Constitution, it is odd that Tushnet
draws the distinction he does, and calls the detailed provisions regard-
ing governmental structures and administrative matters the thick Con-
stitution and the commitments of the Declaration of Independence
and the Preamble the thin Constitution. For one thing, the provisions
of the thick Constitution, on Tushnet's own analysis, are not as rich as,
are less likely "to thrill the heart" than, and are more "desiccated"
than, those of the thin Constitution.94 For another, the provisions of
the thick Constitution are more obviously self-enforcing through the
political processes, even on Tushnet's own analysis, than are those of
the thin Constitution.95 Thus, the case forjudicial enforcement of the
former is weaker, or thinner, than that for the latter. From this per-
spective, the thick Constitution is thinner with respect to the justifica-
tion for enforcing it judicially.
90 See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 214; Fleming, &uring, supra note 4, at 15.
91 See TusHNE-r, supra note 2, at 157-63.
92 See id. at 158-62.
93 For further reflections on the thinness of Tushnet's thin Constitution, see Frank 1.
Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections on Tuslnet s Thin Constitution'), 34 U. Rzci. L
REv. 461 (2000).
94 TusHNur, supra note 2, at 10, 11.
95 Tushnet argues straightfonvardly that the provisions of the thick Constitution are
self-enforcing. See iU at 95-123. By contrast, he argues that the thin Constitution should be
treated as self-enforcing if we assume certain things. Sre id. at 128.
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Tushnet ignores Larry Sager's illuminating reflections on the
thinness of constitutional law in terms of judicial enforceability.90
Sager observes that a striking feature of constitutional law is that the
judicially enforceable Constitution is thinner than the fuller Constitu-
tion that imposes obligations outside the courts which are judicially
underenforced or even unenforced.97 This is not just a terminologi-
cal quibble about the usage of the words thick and thin. There are
also substantive problems with Tushnet's distinction.
Second, let us ponder what Tushnet includes in the thick Consti-
tution as distinguished from the thin Constitution. It is notable that,
in a book published in 1999, Tushnet throws provisions and commit-
ments regarding federalism, states' rights, and separation of powers
into the thick Constitution and claims that they are not part of the
Constitution that constitutes us as a people.98 For we are in the midst
of yet another new federalism in American politics and constitutional
law. And the revival of aggressive judicial protection of federalism,
states' rights, and separation of powers is well underway.9 9 In addi-
tion, there is of course a longstanding tradition in American constitu-
tional thought holding that commitments to federalism and states'
rights-even more than commitments to individual rights-constitute
us as a people. Finally, there are insightful and powerful arguments
that these structural commitments, together with commitments to in-
dividual rights, establish a scheme of multiple repositories of power
and are constitutive of us as a people.100
Indeed, it is telling that Tushnet argues that the Preamble to the
Constitution is part of what constitutes us as a people, yet in his initial
quotation from the Preamble, he omits the aspiration "to form a more
perfect union."'u0 Although he later acknowledges this omission, and
the link between that aspiration and the tradition of federalism and
96 See Sager, Thinness, supra note 1.
97 See id. at 421-22.
98 See TUSHNrr, supra note 2, at 9-14.
99 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the Line
Item Veto Act on separation of powers grounds); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (invalidating federal gun control statute based on federalism concerns); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating federal gun control statute based on
federalism concerns); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a por-
tion of a federal statute requiring states to take title of radioactive waste based on federal-
ism concerns); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating, on separation of
powers grounds, a federal statute that would have allowed Comptroller General to exercise
executive functions); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto on
separation of powers grounds).
100 See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 Cni.-KNrr
L. REV. 477 passim (2000); Abner S. Greene, KiryasJoel and Two Mistakes About Equaliy, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1996).
101 See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 12.
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states' rights,10 2 he fails to consider seriously the possibility that this
aspiration might partly constitute us as a people.
It is understandable why liberals or progressives committed to re-
alizing the other purposes of the Preamble and the principles of the
Declaration of Independence might be wary of federalism and states'
rights (and to a lesser extent separation of powers). After all, commit-
ments to federalism and states' rights have long been identified with
regressive and illiberal commitments and have long stood in the way
of liberal and progressive national reforms. But I would have thought
that such liberals or progressives would stress "to form a more perfect
union" as importantly constitutive of us as a people and as partially
repudiating the states' rights tradition. One of the principal purposes
of the Constitution was to form a more perfect union than existed
under the Articles of Confederation (which was more strongly states'
rightist).1°3 Similarly, one of the principal purposes of Reconstruc-
tion, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, was
to form a more perfect union than existed before the Civil War. 1°4
A fundamental criticism of contemporary Supreme CourtJustices
who have revived aggressive judicial protection of federalism and
states' rights is that they do not appreciate the importance of the
transformation from the Articles of Confederation to the more per-
fect union of the Constitution, as well as the importance of the Recon-
struction amendments, in constituting us as a people. Furthermore,
liberals and progressives committed to vindicating the principles of
the Declaration and furthering the purposes of the Preamble-as
against state encroachment and as against states' rights conceptions-
should stress "to form a more perfect union" and our Constitution's
commitment to a strong national government that is more perfect in
securing those principles and the status of free and equal citizenship
for all.
Tushnet might not include commitments to federalism and
states' rights in the thin Constitution because he is cynical about those
commitments or regards them as sham covers for conservative poli-
cies. The performance of recent Republican Congresses supposedly
committed to federalism and states' rights provides good cause for
such cynicism. Conservatives profess respect for federalism and states'
rights, unless a state tries to secure a right that liberals support and
conservatives oppose. For example, the passage of the Oregon refer-
102 See id at 14.
103 See, e.g., R AciD B. Momus, THE FORGING OF THE UNIONI 1781-1789. at 80-91
(1987).
104 See, eg., HARoL K. Hy.tN, A MORE PERFEcr UNio : THE Lht,.cr OF THE CIILIAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 301 (1975); DAVID A.J. PRciats, Co.savcE
AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LMW OF THE RECONSTRCcION A.ENDME%-. s
137-48 (1993).
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endurm on death with dignity spawned the federal Pain Relief Promo-
tion Act.105 Conservatives claim that family law and tort law are within
the province of state governments, unless they have a vision that they
want to impose nationally, for example, the Defense of Marriage
Act'06 and tort reform. Moreover, conservatives typically criticize the
movement for an independent jurisprudence of state constitutional
law, whereby state courts interpreting state constitutions provide
greater protection for certain rights than has been afforded by the
United States Supreme Court interpreting the United States Constitu-
tion. Some examples are the Kentucky Supreme Court on homosexu-
als' right to privacy and equality (notwithstanding Bowers v,
Hardwick)10 7 and the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Vermont Su-
preme Court on same-sex marriage.' 08
Or perhaps Tushnet believes that the forces of nationalism really
have won and that the latest new federalism is just the last gasp of a
dying tradition. If so, it might be a mistake to include federalism and
states' rights in the thin Constitution as constitutive of us as a people.
But such a belief surely would be short-sighted, in light of the tenacity
of the states' rights tradition (no matter how wrong and wrong-
headed that tradition is).
Finally, we can eliminate another speculation. One can imagine
a constitutional theorist who might wish to distinguish between provi-
sions of the Constitution that are self-enforcing through the political
processes and those that are properly judicially enforced. Such a the-
orist might want to put federalism, states' rights, and separation of
powers in the former category, but to keep rights of equality, freedom
of expression, and liberty in the latter category. But, as we have seen,
Tushnet is not such a constitutional theorist. Although he begins with
an argument that the provisions and commitments of the thick Consti-
tution are self-enforcing, he ultimately argues that the provisions and
principles of the thin Constitution-those which constitute us as a
people-should also be treated as self-enforcing.
I believe that our constitutional commitments to federalism and
separation of powers partly constitute us as a people, not only in their
own right, but also in their connection with substantive commitments
105 H.tL 2260, 106th Cong. (1999).
106 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1994).
107 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy as applied to
homosexuals).
108 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage violates common benefits clause of state constitution); Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (striking down statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex
partners on equal protection grounds under state constitution); Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (striking down state statute criminalizing sodomy on
grounds of state constitution's protection of privacy and equal protection).
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to freedom, equality, andjustice. Yet those commitments are properly
treated as self-enforcing through the political processes. There is
neither a need, nor a good argument, for aggressive judicial enforce-
ment of them, notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's misguided revi-
val of aggressive judicial review in the areas of federalism and
separation of powers.
Now let us take up the thin Constitution as Tushnet conceives it.
The flrst thing to note about Tushnet's conception is just how thin it
is in what it includes. The thin Constitution consists of "its fundamen-
tal guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty," along
with the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the pur-
poses of the Preamble that resonate with the Declaration.10 9 It is not
dear whether it includes the provisions of the Bill of Rights as a
whole, to say nothing of President Franklin Roosevelt's "second Bill of
Rights" dealing with economics and social welfare.110
The second thing to note is the thinness of Tushnet's account of
the principles of the thin Constitution. He does not elaborate its prin-
ciples in a substantive constitutional or political theory. This is nota-
ble because many constitutional theorists who have invoked the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble in constitutional in-
terpretation have done so to bolster a substantive constitutional or
political theory, as against other constitutional theories that are said to
omit, exclude, or ignore certain of our deepest commitments ex-
pressed in those texts. Such theorists invoke the Declaration and Pre-
amble in service of a substantive vision of the commitments of the
Constitution.'
By contrast, in Tushnet's analysis, the thin Constitution serves not
as a substantive vision but instead as a frame in terms of which we
should carry out constitutional interpretation and argumentation. A
conscientious legislator, executive, or citizen should frame his or her
arguments about the Constitution in terms of carrying on the project
109 TusHNEr, supra note 2, at 11.
110 Tushnet states: "The second Bill of Rights, along ith the first, would, in
Roosevelt's view, carry out the project the United States began in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." Id. at 172. From this statement, however, it is not clear whether Tushnet en-
dorses Roosevel's view of the Bill of Rights and the "second Bill of Rights."
111 See, eg., AXHIL REED AsstAR, THE BiLL OF RtGrrs 27-28, 47, 298-99 (1998); BRVER,
supra note 23, at 33-35, 51-53; Randy E. Barnett, Ceiing Nonnath,e: The Ro!e of NauraliRights
in ConstitutionalAdjudkation, 12 CoNsr. Co.txr. 93, 105-13 (1995); Charles L Black,Jr.,
Further Refledions on the ConstitutionalJustiee of Livelhood, 86 CoLu.i. L RL,. 1103 passim
(1986); Walter F. Murphy, An Orderingof Constitutional Values, 53 S. CA. L. RE%. 703,747-50
(1980). TwoJustices of the current Supreme Court have invoked the Declaration of Inde-
pendence to bolster their particular substantive conceptions of the Constitution. &e
Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261,330-57 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 229-35 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain
Reading" of the Constitution-The Dedaration of Indpendence in Constitutional Interpretation, 80
How. UJ. 983 (1987).
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of realizing certain commitments expressed in the Declaration and
the Preamble. This is ironic, given that Tushnet builds upon Lin-
coln's image of the Constitution being the frame for the Declaration,
the apple of gold or the picture. 112 For it appears that in Tushnet's
analysis, the Declaration itself serves as a frame, rather than as a pic-
ture or substantive vision.
Put another way, Tushnet's notion of the thin Constitution as
constituting us as a people stems from a view of the thin Constitution
not as manifesting a substantive vision, but as expressing an attitude of
conscientious faith in the project of realizing the commitments of the
Declaration and the Preamble-whatever the people may decide they
turn out to be. This should come as no surprise, given Tushnet's
heartfelt acknowledgment in the preface of his book to Sanford Levin-
son,"13 the author of Constitutional Faith, a book that propounds such a
view.114 Tushnet offers glimmerings of a substantive vision of what
those commitments are, beyond an attitude of commitment to a con-
stitutional faith in the thin Constitution. Yet, he does not elaborate
those glimmerings, perhaps because doing so, on his view, might un-
dermine the project of populist constitutional law. Indeed, Tushnet
differentiates his project of populist constitutional law from a view
that the principles of the Declaration of Independence and Preamble
can be elaborated without reference to what the people, acting
through self-government, actually decide to pursue.115 Presumably,
he refers to the approach taken by constitutional theorists who elabo-
rate a substantive vision of the commitments of the Declaration and
the Preamble.
B. Is the Thinness of Tushnet's Thin Constitution a Weakness
or a Strength?
Tushnet's thin Constitution is too thin to do the work of consti-
tuting us as a people. Furthermore, his account of how the thin Con-
stitution constitutes us as a people is too thin. He neither adequately
explains what it means to constitute us as a people nor gives an ade-
quate account of what he means by a people. Although he gives some
examples of conceptions of what it means to be an American, 11 6 all of
those conceptions are quite thin.
Tushnet likely would reply that, far from being a weakness, the
thinness of the thin Constitution is a strength. He states that "the
thinness of the populist Constitution is essential if the position I am
112 See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 14.
113 See id. at xii.
114 See LEVINSON, supra note 1.
115 See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 183.
116 See id. at 182.
236 [Vol. 86:215
THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS
developing is to be at-all defensible."11 7 He evidently believes that this
very thinness is what enables the thin Constitution to constitute us as a
people in a project of populist constitutional law and self-government.
He might say that, to pursue this project, we do not need a brilliant
liberal or progressive political or constitutional theorist to elaborate
the substantive vision of the Declaration and the Preamble and then
to argue for imposing it upon an unwilling people from the top down.
Instead, he might say, we need a text or texts for our constitutional
faith, and we need to encourage legislators, executives, and citizens,
along with judges, to reflect conscientiously upon the meaning and
entailments of its commitments and how better to realize them over
time.
I want to reflect upon Tushnet's views that the thin Constitution
constitutes us as a people and that its thinness is a virtue. I shall do so
in light of arguments by both civic republicans and civic liberals that
we need a thicker formative project or public philosophy (than the
one that allegedly prevails) to constitute us as a people. The very thin-
ness of Tushnet's thin Constitution is notable at the present time,
when both civic republicans and civic liberals manifest such yearnings
for a thicker vision.118 Tushnet's thin Constitution is also notable for
being even thinner than the visions of some prominent constitutional
theorists who have made the thinness of constitutional law a virtue.'1 9
First, if the thin Constitution is as thin as Tushnet says it is, can it
really do the work of constituting us as a people? At its worst, its com-
mitments may amount to little more than the stuff of relatively vacu-
ous slogans at Fourth ofJuly celebrations. At its best, its commitments
may prove to be nothing more than a frame, or attitude, in the sense
described above. Of course, Tushnet might say that a thin Constitu-
tion as a frame or attitude is quite enough, and it is problematically
elitist for constitutional theorists to hanker for a substantive constitu-
tional theory that would constrain popular self-government.' 20
He also might say that the project of constituting us as a people is
appropriately thin in a regime of populist constitutional law, in which
the point is to enable the people to govern themselves rather than to
impose a conception ofjustice or a conception of the good upon the
117 1& at 13.
118 See, eg., MicIHAELJ. SANDEL, DE..ocRAcy's DzscoNwEr: As rucA IN SEARCH OF ,A
PuBuc PHILOSOPHY 4-7, 25-28 (1996) (developing a civic republicanism); Sn'rPE.
MACEDO, DvraEsmrn AND DismusT: Cmc EDUCATON IN A MULTICULTURAL Dr.stoCimmc 8-10
(2000) (developing a civic liberalism).
119 See, eg., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A Tv.m JUDICIAL M1UL ,ILSMt ON THE SV-
PRY-NME COURT 3-6 (1999).
120 For an example of a work of populist constitutional law that sounds such an antie-
litist note, see RIcHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, ThE PEOPLE RULE: A Co,,r.rrirno\.a PoPuusr
MANIFSso (1994).
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people in the name of constituting them as a people. For, he might
contend, to constitute a people is not the same thing as to govern
them or to constrain their self-government. Rather, it is to establish a
workable framework or appropriate attitude and to leave it to the peo-
ple to reflect, deliberate, and decide about the meaning and entail-
ments of our commitments in the Declaration and the Preamble
through a project of self-government and populist constitutional law.
He might argue that it is especially appropriate that the thin Constitu-
tion be very thin, given what Rawls calls "the fact of reasonable
[moral] pluralism" as a permanent feature of our constitutional de-
mocracy121 (although Tushnet's project proves to be thinner, in those
circumstances, than a Rawlsian project would be).
Whether Tushnet's thin Constitution is thick enough to consti-
tute us as a people depends importantly upon what we mean by "con-
stituting." It could mean something as thin as establishing a people in
the nominal sense: a people consists of those persons who profess a
faith in the principles of the Declaration and the Preamble, however
they understand them or come to understand them over time through
a project of self-government. It could also mean something as thick as
establishing a people in a formative sense: developing in citizens the
capacities for self-government, inculcating in them the attitudes, traits
of character, and civic virtues necessary for self-government, or indeed
inculcating in citizens a conception ofjustice or a conception of the
good.
For example, Sandel's notion of a formative project of govern-
ment to cultivate the capacities, traits of character, and civic virtues
required for republican self-government reflects a conception of what
it means to constitute a people.122 His idea of a formative project of
constituting citizens for a civic republican polity is much thicker than
the project Tushnet contemplates. Moreover, Sandel's idea leads to
substantive moral argument-not only in political discourse, but also
in constitutional law (along with a rich public philosophy) -of a sort
too thick for Tushnet's taste, especially to the extent Sandel contem-
plates judicial enforcement of that public philosophy, or of constitu-
tional commitments in its name (as he does in certain respects). 123
From Sandel's standpoint, the allegedly prevailing liberal public phi-
losophy is too thin, and the constitutional law that it sponsors is too
de-moralized, to constitute us as a people. By analogy to Sandel's civic
republicanism, Macedo advances a civic liberalism that espouses a
121 TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 77-86 (discussing Rawls's arguments about reasonable
pluralism and public reason, as developed in JOHN RAWLS, PoUTIcAl LIsEnusaS (1993)).
122 See SANDEL, supra note 118, at 5-7, 128-33.
123 Elsewhere, I have assessed Sandel's call for substantive moral argument in constitu-
tional law. SeeJames E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76
Tux. L. Rav. 509 (1997) (reviewing SANDEL, supra note 118).
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formative project of developing in citizens the capacities, traits of
character, and civic virtues required for liberal constitutional democ-
racy (as understood within Rawls's political liberalism). 12 4
From Tushnet's perspective, the projects of Sandel and Macedo,
and perhaps even those of the allegedly prevailing liberal public phi-
losophy and constitutional law, are too thick. The latter point is sug-
gested by Tushnet's analysis of "the constitutional law of religion
outside the courts." 125 On Tushnet's view, only a thinner Constitution
can constitute us as a people-one that can embrace both Ronald
Dworkin and Clarence Thomas, both Justice Brennan and Justice
Scalia.
It may be illuminating to compare Tushnet's thin constitutional-
ism with that of his sometime coauthor, Cass Sunstein.12 6 Each of
them proposes to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts.
And each of them attempts to develop a theory that is thinner than
prevailing theories, thus making the thinness of constitutional law a
virtue. Sunstein's development of judicial minimalism in his new
book, One Case at a Time,127 can be interpreted, in part, as an answer
to his own earlier call in The Parial Constitution for taking seriously the
idea of the Constitution outside the courts. 28 One might think that
this call means that not just courts, but also legislatures and execu-
tives, should be fora of principle. As such, it is a valuable corrective to
overdrawn contrasts between courts as the forum of principle and leg-
islatures as the battleground of power politics. But for Sunstein, who
argues that legislatures and executives, rather than courts, are the true
fora of principle,129 the slogan "the Constitution outside the courts"
practically has come to mean "get the Constitution outside of the
courts!"
One also might think that the call for the Constitution outside
the courts promises to liberate constitutional theory from its court-
centeredness-whether it be the court-centeredness of those who are
obsessed with courts as vindicators of rights or of those who are ob-
sessed with the institutional limits of courts-or, in Mark Graber's
term, to "delegalize" it.13S Yet, ironically, Sunstein's recent work may
124 SeeMACEDo, supra note 118, at 169-72.
125 TusHmzr, supra note 2, at 72-94.
126 Tushnet and Sunstein are coauthors of a leading casebook in constitutional law.
See GEOFFRE'Y R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTIN & MARK V. TuSHNET, Co.%sTI.
trunoNAL LAw (3d ed. 1996).
127 SutsrEYN, supra note 119. In this paragraph in the text, along uith the follow ing
paragraph, I draw upon an argument that I made elsewhere. SeeFleming & McClain, supra
note 123, at 546.
128 See StusirzN, supra note 1, at 9-10.
129 See SuNsTrEN, supra note 69, at 7, 59-60.
130 Mark A. Graber, Ddegalizing Constitudonal Theoy, GooD Soc:'Y Fall 1996, at 47.
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shackle constitutional theory to concern for institutional limits of
courts-or legalize it with a vengeance.
Tushnet carries this quest for thinness and minimalism even fur-
ther. His avowed aim is to take the Constitution away from the courts,
And there is little risk that he will "legalize" the Constitution through
judicial minimalism, for he disparages the "formulaic Constitution" as
uninspiring-even "desiccated"-and ill-suited for the hortatory pur-
poses of the Constitution in populist constitutional law. 131 Tushnet
goes far beyond Sunstein's theory ofjudicial minimalism, which seeks
to make judicial review democracy-forcing or -reinforcing. Tushnet
goes all the way to a theory of the self-enforcing Constitution, in order
to let the people rule.
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM OUTSIDE THE COURTS
In previous work, I outlined and developed a constitutional con-
structivism or a Constitution-perfecting theory-a theory that rein-
forces not only the procedural liberties, but also the substantive
liberties embodied in our Constitution-by analogy to a process-
perfecting theory of the sort famously propounded by Ely and Sun-
stein.132 At first glance, my theory might appear to entail an aggres-
sive theory ofjudicial supremacy; indeed, it might appear to be one of
the grandest, court-loving theories of them all. For one thing, my the-
ory builds upon and has deep affinities with the constitutional theory
of Dworkin, who is generally regarded as one of the most judicial-
supremacist, court-centered theorists around. In addition, it argues
for courts securing not only the basic liberties that are preconditions
for deliberative democracy, much like Ely and Sunstein, but also those
that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy-basic liberties with
respect to which many constitutional theories advocate deference to
legislatures for one reason or another.133
131 TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 11, 111-12 (drawing from ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OFJUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)).
132 See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 214-17; Fleming, Securing, supra note 4, at
15.
133 See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 218, 233-35, 252-60; Fleming, Securing,
supra note 4, at 2-3, 14-15. Indeed, one scholar, reflecting upon the bicentennial of Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)-and its classic debate between justices Chase as consti-
tutional idealist and Iredell as constitutional skeptic-has characterized my theory as that
of a latter-day Justice Chase (and Jeremy Waldron's theory, see infra text accompanying
notes 166-67, as that of a latter-day Justice Iredell). See Edward B. Foley, The Bicentennial of
Calder v. Bull: In Defense of a Democratic Middle Ground, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 1599 (1998). Foley
charges me, like justice Chase, with "largely ignor[ing] the institutional issue of who
should decide controversial questions concerning the proper scope of personal liberties"
and in that sense being court-centered. Id. at 1612.
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Yet, in the first instance, constitutional constructivism is a theory
of what the Constitution -is and how it ought to be interpreted, not
primarily a theory of who may authoritatively interpret it. It is a sub-
stantive constitutional theory that claims to provide the best interpre-
tation-in Dworkin's terms, the best fit and justification-of the
American constitutional document and underlying constitutional or-
der, or to make them the best they can be.'3 It is neither merely a
theory of judicial review, nor does it automatically entail that all its
principles, aspirations, and ends are to be judicially enforced. It is
addressed not only to courts, but also to legislatures, executives, and
citizens generally.
Here I want to address the question of who may authoritatively
interpret the Constitution, with particular reference to the idea of tak-
ing the Constitution seriously outside the courts. First, I draw to-
gether several intimations of a general view appearing in my prior
work. Second, I develop those intimations further.
In Constructing the Substantive Constitution, I note that "[iln gen-
eral, constitutional constructivism is a conception of what the Consti-
tution is, how it ought to be interpreted, and who may authoritatively
interpret it."135 With respect to who, I state that constitutional con-
structivism holds that, although the Supreme Court generally is the
ultimate (but not the exclusive) institutional interpreter in any given
case, We the People are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitu-
tion. 136 It entails what Levinson has called a "protestant" as opposed
to a court-centered "catholic" conception of who may authoritatively
interpret the Constitution. 3 7 On this view, the Constitution is ad-
dressed not merely, and not even in the first instance, to courts; it is
addressed also to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. To
paraphrase Marbury again, "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department, the legislative department, the executive de-
partment, and the citizenry generally to say what the law is." This view
is consistent with the best reading of Marburq the narrow as opposed
to the broad reading. It is also consistent with the long tradition and
practice of the president, Congress, and citizens claiming authority to
interpret the Constitution independently from courts. In short, the
Constitution imposes obligations upon legislatures, executive officials,
judges, and citizens to take the Constitution seriously and to consider
134 See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 282; Fleming, Securihg, supra note 4, at 14.
135 Fleming, Constnuding, supra note 4, at 290.
136 See id. at 291.
137 LEV soN, supra note 1, at 27-53, 29 (describing the "protestant" position as *based
on the legitimacy of individualized (or at least nonhierarchial communal) interpretation,"
while the "catholic" position is that "the Supreme Court is the dispenser of ultimate
interpretation").
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conscientiously its implications for contemplated actions before tak-
ing them.
Furthermore, I distinguish between the partial, judicially enforce-
able Constitution and the whole Constitution, which is binding
outside the courts upon legislatures, executive officials, and citizens
generally in our constitutional democracy (unless and until they
amend it). 1 8 For example, although the Constitution might impose
affirmative obligations upon the legislative and executive branches of
government, such as a constitutional obligation to provide a social
minimum of goods and services to meet the basic needs of all citizens,
it might not accord a judicially enforceable right to such subsistence
in the absence of legislative or executive measures. Other constitu-
tional theorists, upon whose work I have built, have expressed similar
views concerning the gap between the judicially enforceable Constitu-
tion and the Constitution that is binding outside the courts.139
I also argue, drawing upon Rawls and Dworkin, respectively, that
the Supreme Court is an "exemplar of public reason" in a "forum of
principle."140 But, like Rawls and unlike Dworkin, I argue that it is not
the exclusive voice of such reason, nor is it the sole forum of princi-
ple: "'[W]hile the Court is special in this respect, the other branches
of government can certainly, if they would but do so, be forums of
principle along with it in debating constitutional questions.""141 In
other words, constitutional constructivism is a theory of the Constitu-
tion, not merely a theory ofjudicial review. Moreover, judicial review
is subject to certain institutional limits in carrying out social reform.
In American Constitutional Interpretation,142 a casebook I
coauthored with Walter Murphy and Sotirios Barber, we conceive the
enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of three basic
interrogatives: What is the Constitution?; Who may authoritatively in-
terpret it?; and How ought it to be interpreted? 4 In our treatment of
the questions What? and Who? and in our selection of cases and mater-
ials bearing on those questions, we commit ourselves to a rather mus-
cular conception of the Constitution outside the courts, rather than
simply focusing on constitutional interpretation by courts and on con-
stitutional law as the product of Supreme Court decisions. In The Ca-
non and the Constitution Outside the Courts, Barber and I briefly develop
138 See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 291.
139 See, e.g., SUNSTrIN, supra note 1, at 9-10, 138-40, 145-61, 350; Sager, Fair Measure,
supra note 1, at 1213-28; Sager, Thinness, supra note 1, at 414-19.
140 Fleming, Constructing, supra note 4, at 291-92 (citing RAWLS, supra note 121, at 231,
235-57, 240, and DwouaN, supra note 25, at 69-71 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141 Fleming, Constructing supra note 4, at 292 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 121, at 240).
142 See WALTER F. MuRPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & SOTIRuos A. BARBER, AMERicAN CONSTV
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 1995).
143 See id. at 16-19.
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that conception with reference to the issue of "the canon of constitu-
tional law."144
Finally, in Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner,145 I
argue for judicial underenforcement of economic liberties and prop-
erty rights. I grant that economic liberties and property rights, like
personal liberties, are fundamental rights secured by our Constitu-
tion. 14 In fact, I contend that economic liberties and property rights
are so fundamental in our constitutional scheme, and so sacred in our
constitutional culture, that there is no need, and no good argument,
for aggressive judicial protection of them. 4 7 Rather, such liberties are
properly understood as "judicially underenforced norms," to use
Sager's term.148 Their fuller enforcement and protection is secure
with legislatures and executives in "the Constitution outside the
Courts," as Sunstein would put it.14 9
I also criticize the organizers of-and most of the participants
in-the symposium in which that paper appeared for failing to recog-
nize the distinction between the judicially enforceable Constitution
and the Constitution that is binding outside the courts.150 What turns
on this distinction is whether protection of constitutional rights is con-
fined to judicial enforcement or whether it also includes enforcement
by legislatures and executives. Also at stake is whether legislatures and
executives, when acting in the absence ofjudicially enforceable rights,
should be seen as bound by constitutionally imposed obligations or
instead as free to act in constitutionally gratuitous ways. To say that a
right is notjudicially enforceable is not to say that it concerns a matter
that is constitutionally gratuitous in the sense that legislatures, execu-
tives, and citizens generally are free to protect it or not as they wish.
Rather, a right that is not judicially enforceable imposes obligations
upon legislatures, executives, and citizens to respect it or indeed to
protect it affirmatively. Legislatures and executives, as well as courts,
have responsibilities to interpret the Constitution conscientiously and
to secure our basic liberties.
In elaborating on this argument, I incorporate portions of
Tushnet's analysis but also point out the need for certain things that
are missing from his analysis. I have stated that in talking aboutjudi-
cial supremacy, it is important to distinguish between two versions,
ultimate (or final) and exclusive (or only). Many constitutional theo-
144 See Sotirios A. Barber &James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution Ouide the
Courts; 17 CozsT. ComwmN1T. (forthcoming 2000).
145 See Fleming, Fdeity, supra note 4.
146 See id. at 164-73.
147 See id. at 147.
148 Sager, Fair Measur4 supra note 1, at 1213; Sager, Thinness; supra note 1, at 419.
149 SusrEIN, supra note 1, at 9-10.
150 See Fleming, Fdelity. supra note 4, at 168-69.
2000]
CORNELL lAW REVIEW
rists, including Tushnet, acknowledge that distinction, yet put it aside
or ignore it. In fact, Tushnet's arguments against judicial supremacy
are cogent against the exclusivity version of it, but not with respect to
the ultimacy version. Indeed, Tushnet carefully couches his argu-
ments, making claims about what nonjudicial actors who disagree with
courts may conscientiously do even in a regime with a general theory
of judicial supremacy. Here he surely means judicial supremacy as
ultirnacy, because his claims would not make sense in a regime ofjudi-
cial supremacy as exclusivity. Tushnet, however, then proceeds as if
he demolished judicial supremacy as ultimacy as well. Not so fast. It is
possible, and eminently defensible, to adopt his arguments against ju-
dicial supremacy without foreswearingjudicial supremacy as ultimacy.
Tushnet's analysis suggests some of the things we should do if we
are to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts. First, we
should develop, or reinvigorate, a rigorous and coherent notion of
political questions, that is, questions the resolution of which the Con-
stitution commits to institutions besides the courts. We need not only
a careflully articulated justification for the idea of political questions in
general (after all, the doctrine has taken a beating from court-cen-
tered or court-loving judicial supremacists), but also a clearly specified
set of political questions.
Second, we should generalize the notion of political questions in
service of an argument that nonjudicial actors have an obligation to
take the Constitution seriously outside the courts, as well as in service
of an argument forjudicial deference to such actors in certain circum-
stances. Many arguments for judicial deference to the judgments of
legislatures and executives simply emphasize the respect that courts
owe the coordinate branches of government. Those arguments
should go deeper, and ask why respect should be due a coordinate
branch of government. The most defensible answer to that question
is that the coordinate branch of government, like courts, is under the
obligation conscientiously to interpret the Constitution before taking
contemplated actions and is presumed to have discharged that
obligation.
Put another way, we should revive, but reconstruct and prune, an
element in Thayer's classic argument for judicial deference to the na-
tional legislature and executive.' 5 ' Thayer presumed that Congress
and the president, not courts, had primary authority to interpret the
Constitution. For him, the question ofjudicial review was not a ques-
tion of what the Constitution means, but instead a question of
whether the judgment of Congress or the president about what the
Constitution means was itself reasonable, or at any rate not clearly un-
151 See Thayer, supra note 87, at 148-56.
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reasonable.1 52 The part of Thayer that I would reconstruct and prune
is the idea that legislatures and executives have the authority and the
obligation independently to interpret the Constitution. The part of
Thayer that I would eliminate is the idea that courts are to be con-
cerned solely with the question of reasonableness, not with the ques-
tion of constitutionality. Furthermore, I would reject his stance of
judicial deference to the national political processes across the board;
instead, I would favor such deference only outside the situations in
which we have good reason to distrust those processes.
We must recognize, as Tushnet argues, that the Constitution is
self-enforcing through the political processes in large areas in which
the Supreme Court is quite aggressive today, including most impor-
tantly the areas of federalism, states' rights, and separation of
powers.
5 3
We must also recognize that the Constitution is not self-enforcing
through the political processes in general or in certain other areas. In
particular, it is not self-enforcing with respect to individual rights in
what Tushnet calls the thin Constitution, especially those rights which
are preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the polit-
ical processes. Thus, a Constitution-perfecting or Constitution-rein-
forcing approach to judicial review is warranted in these areas.
Finally, we must recognize that the contrast betveen courts as the
forum of principle and legislatures as the battleground of power polit-
ics is overstated. In constitutional theory, there are several familiar
responses to this contrast, including several familiar attempts to blunt
it. One approach is to obliterate the contrast, saying that neither insti-
tution is a forum of principle and that not only legislatures but also
courts are battlegrounds of power politics. This approach is common
in both political science literature about courts and in public choice
literature in legal scholarship. 54
A second approach is partially to invert the contrast and to say
that, historically, legislatures and executives have been the true fora of
principle, or at least better fora of principle than courts.,' Propo-
152 See id. at 150.
153 When I say that the Constitution is self-enforcing with respect to federalism and
states' rights, I am speaking of the idea that there are federalism.related limitations upon
Congress's otherwise plenary powers. I emphatically am not speaking of federalism and
states' rights in the sense of state laws in general, nor am I saying that the Constitution is
self-enforcing in general with respect to the actions ofstate governments. Not even Thayer
advocated judicial deference to state laws, though this is commonly overlooked. See id. at
154-55.
154 See, eg., JFaR- SEGAL & HARoLD SPAerH, THE SUPREME COURT A .D THE Arrrrtni.
NAL MODEL (1993); Frank B. Cross, TheJudiday and Public CQoie, 50 HAsru-Gs LJ. 355
(1999); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and dte New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Inter-
disciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L REv. 251 (1997).
155 See, e.g., Su'srm, supra note 69, at 7, 59-60.
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nents of this approach typically charge that the contrast rests upon a
historically myopic idolization of the Warren Court. This approach
does not literally invert the contrast because it does not claim that
courts are a battleground of power politics. The typical view, instead,
is that courts "follow the election returns" rather than being an inde-
pendent bulwark of rights or forum of principle. Another variation
posits that when courts do not follow the election returns, they typi-
cally lag behind rather than forge ahead and therefore, historically,
have largely been conservative rather than liberal or progressive.
Thus, this approach leads to the claim that legislatures and executives,
historically, have been more reliable and more effective forces for lib-
eral or progressive change-and for the fuller realization of constitu-
tional principles of freedom, equality, and justice-than have courts.
A third approach, which I take, is to argue that taking the Consti-
tution seriously outside the courts requires that legislatures and exec-
utives, along with courts, be fora of principle in certain respects. This
approach is implicit in Rawls's statement, quoted above: "[W] hile the
Court is special in this respect [as an "exemplar of public reason" in a
"forum of principle"], the other branches of government can cer-
tainly, if they would but do so, be forums of principle along with it in
debating constitutional questions."156 Such an approach grows out of
Rawls's conception of constitutional democracy. I believe that such
an approach is broadly compatible with Gutmann and Thompson's
conception of deliberative democracy in Democracy and Disagreement.15 7
This approach might seem to reflect a view that legislatures and exec-
utives are no different from courts in this respect, but it need not.
The point is that the contrast is overdrawn and that legislatures and
executives, like courts, have obligations conscientiously to engage in
constitutional interpretation and to vindicate constitutional norms.
For this approach to get off the ground, we need an account of
constitutional interpretation outside the courts. That is, we need an
account of what legislatures and executives are supposed to do when
they engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation. It would
be unpersuasive to contend that legislatures and executives are obli-
gated to do exactly what courts must do when they engage in consci-
entious constitutional interpretation. Such an approach is both
unrealistic and undesirable. We need and benefit from an institu-
tional division of labor, even if we should not overstate what that divi-
sion of labor is.
At the same time, it would be unpersuasive to say that we should
take the Constitution away from the courts and just let legislatures and
156 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
157 See AmY GuTmANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 34, 45-47
(1996).
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executives go on as before. This course of action might be more ac-
ceptable for the president than for Congress, given the practice of the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in advising the President on constitu-
tional issues. To be sure, the advice that the OLC renders is probably
more court-centered than would be desirable in a "protestant" consti-
tutional regime that takes the Constitution seriously outside the
courts, but at least it is something. 58 Furthermore, because presi-
dents in our "extended republic" may have more critical distance and
detachment from the pressure of particular interests than do repre-
sentatives and even senators, they may have more room to reflect
upon and deliberate about constitutional questions.
Tushnet does not provide a full account of how legislatures and
executives should go about interpreting the Constitution once we
"take the Constitution away from courts." He mainly dears the
ground for such an account and implies, in arguing against judicial
supremacy, that legislators and executives may be more conscientious
in resisting judicial interpretations of the Constitution than is com-
monly recognized. 159 He also says, in defending the capacities of leg-
islators and executives to engage in conscientious constitutional
interpretation, that "judicial overhang" may stunt the growth of such
capacities.' 60 He strongly implies that legislators and executives
would do a better job of interpreting the Constitution ifjudicial over-
hang were eliminated by taking the Constitution away from courts. 161
He is far less cynical, and far more sanguine, in assessing the incen-
tives of legislatures and executives to engage in conscientious constitu-
tional interpretation, than are most constitutional law professors and
political science professors. 162
Fair enough. But we still need a fuller account of how legislators
and executives should go about conscientiously interpreting the Con-
stitution. Of course, Tushnet might contend that we do not need
such an account because, on his view, the thick Constitution is already
158 The Senate and House also have their own offices of legal counsel-the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel and the General Counsel to the House-but those bodies (more
than the executive branch's Office of Legal Counsel) mainly engage in constitutional re-
view in a defensive posture, after legislation has been passed and is being challenged in
litigation. On the one hand, one might think that such an after-the-fact practice makes it
less likely that the Senate and House would conscientiously consider constitutional ques-
tions before passing legislation. On the other hand, one might think that bringing such
offices into the legislative process to seek their advice on constitutional questions before
legislation is passed would lead to a form of abdication: members of the Senate and House,
instead of conscientiously deliberating about their responsibilities under the Constitution,
might conceive constitutional questions as questions for their chambers' lavyers in their
office of legal counsel.
159 See TusHNET, supra note 2, at 14-26.
160 Id at 57-65.
161 See id. at 65.
162 See i& at 95-128.
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self-enforcing through the political processes and the thin Constitu-
ton should be treated as self-enforcing. Perhaps Tushnet's argument
entails nothing more than the suggestion that legislators, executives,
and citizens should frame their reflections, deliberations, and deci-
sions more explicitly in terms of furthering the project of the thin
Constitution. Thus, once we take the Constitution away from courts,
it might turn out that the reflections, deliberations, and decisions of
conscientious legislators, executives, or citizens would otherwise go on
pretty much as before. In other words, Tushnet may have pro-
pounded as full an account of constitutional interpretation outside
the courts as he needs or wants, given his conception of the thin Con-
stitution and of its role in populist constitutional law.
But it seems that we need a richer account of constitutional inter-
pretation outside the courts by legislatures, executives, and even citi-
zens generally than Tushnet provides, as well as a richer account of
legislation itself. One account, implicitly provided by Louis Fisher in
his voluminous work on the Constitution outside the courts, 63 is that
Congress and the president do a better job of protecting constitu-
tional structures and rights than court-loving constitutional scholars
would ever appreciate or acknowledge. Indeed, he claims that legisla-
tures and executives do a better job than courts in this respect. This
account reflects the view that Congress and the president have en-
gaged in conscientious constitutional interpretation all along, even if
they have not had a well articulated account of how to do so.
Another account, offered by Keith Whittington in Constitutional
Construction,'M is that Congress and the president are obligated to en-
gage in, and have engaged in (to a larger extent than is realized), a
practice of constitutional construction as distinguished from the prac-
tice of constitutional interretation as it is carried on by courts.16 One
might welcome Whittington's account of construction without ac-
cepting his contrasting account of judicial interpretation. Further-
more, one might combine Whittington's account of constitutional
construction by legislatures and executives with a Dworkinian account
of constitutional interpretation by judges.
Still another approach, offered by Jeremy Waldron in The Dignity
of Legislation,166 is to provide a more positive picture of legislation than
that which has characterized recent discussions of the relative institu-
tional competences of courts and legislatures. This picture, as his title
163 See, e.g., Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALocuES: INTERPRETATION AS POLTICAL
PROCESS (1988); Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVmINs, PoLrniCAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTTUTiONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1996); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.
L REv. 707 (1985).
164 WHITTINGTON, supra note 1.
165 See id. at 1-30.
166 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNIr OF L ISLATION (1999).
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suggests, would stress the dignity of legislation. Waldron evidently as-
pires to do for legislation what Dworkin is thought to have done for
adjudication.16 7 At the same time, Waldron also offers a more dispar-
aging picture of adjudication than is common in the work of Ameri-
can constitutional scholars. Although Waldron's project of digniling
legislation certainly is a worthy one, it is not clear that he has realized
it or that American legislatures are likely to live up to it. At the very
least, however, Waldron has persuaded me that we must rethink our
overly disparaging picture of legislation. Together, Waldron and
Tushnet have persuaded me that we must rethink our overly glorifying
picture of adjudication.
CONCLUSION
Realization of the calls for taking the Constitution seriously
outside the courts and for developing forms of constitutional theory
that are less court-centered has been slower than we might have
hoped or expected. Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts makes considerable progress on this project. Nomithstanding
my criticisms, I believe it to be Tushnet's best book yet and to be as
provocative and significant a contribution to this project as we have
seen to date. It certainly has helped clear the ground for others to
carry forward this project.
167 See i& at 1.
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